On the automaticity of language processing by Hartsuiker, Robert & Moors, Agnes
On the automaticity of language processing 
 
 
Robert J. Hartsuiker and Agnes Moors 
 
 
Abstract 
 
People speak and listen to language all the time. Given this high frequency of use, it 
is often suggested that at least some aspects of language processing are highly 
overlearned and therefore occur “automatically”. Here we critically examine this 
suggestion. We first sketch a framework that views automaticity as a set of 
interrelated features of mental processes and a matter of degree rather than a single 
feature that is all-or-none. We then apply this framework to language processing. To 
do so, we carve up the processes involved in language use according to (a) whether 
language processing takes place in monologue or dialogue, (b) whether the individual 
is comprehending or producing language, (c) whether the spoken or written modality 
is used, and (d) the linguistic processing level at which they occur, that is, phonology, 
the lexicon, syntax, or conceptual processes. This exercise suggests that while 
conceptual processes are relatively non-automatic (as is usually assumed), there is 
also considerable evidence that syntactic and lexical lower-level processes are not 
fully automatic. We close by discussing entrenchment as a set of mechanisms 
underlying automatization. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In The modularity of mind, Fodor (1983) quoted Merrill Garrett’s view on the 
automaticity of sentence parsing during language comprehension: “What you have to 
remember about parsing is that basically it’s a reflex”. Around the same time, Levelt 
(1989) discussed the automaticity of language production. Whereas some language 
production processes, such as determining the message one wishes to convey and 
checking one’s speech for errors and other problems were considered to be non-
automatic, all the other components were claimed to be largely automatic. According 
to both authors, some of the core processes in the comprehension and production of 
language basically run off by themselves, without control and without involvement of 
working memory. In this chapter we ask to what extent such a view holds. 
  A priori, language processing seems to be an excellent candidate for a system 
of automatic processes. Speaking and listening are activities we engage in routinely 
and so are practiced very well. Language processing is difficult to counteract: It is 
very difficult to listen to someone and deliberately not understand what they are 
saying. Much of language processing is unconscious. When we say a word, we 
retrieve and order its phonemes, but we are usually not aware of the details of 
phonological encoding. Additionally, language processing proceeds very quickly and 
accurately: we can read about 4 words per second and speak at about half that rate, 
finding words from a lexicon containing at least 30,000 words, while producing 
speech errors at a rate of less than 1 per 1000 words (e.g. Levelt, 1989). All of these 
properties (routinization, specialization, mandatory processing, unconscious 
processing, and speed) point to a strong degree of automatization. 
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 On the other hand, there are also indications that language processing is not 
completely automatic. For example, there is a long research tradition investigating the 
role of working memory in sentence understanding (e.g. Caplan & Waters, 1999; 
Gibson, 2000; Just & Carpenter, 1992). Although theoretical proposals differ, they 
have in common that understanding is constrained by a limited memory capacity. 
Furthermore, Garrett’s reflex-like model of parsing breaks down when the reader 
encounters garden-path sentences such as (1).  
 
(1) The man accepted the prize was not for him. 
 
Arguably, to resolve a temporary structural ambiguity as in (1), processes concerned 
with error detection and revision need to be involved, which some authors view as 
non-automatic (e.g. Hahne & Friederici, 1999). Further, second language learners 
often experience difficulties in the comprehension of complex sentences (e.g. Clahsen 
& Felser, 2006), which indicates that at least in some stages of language learning 
sentence comprehension is not fully automatic. To sum up, sentence parsing seems to 
be constrained by working memory, regularly recruits control processes, and is less 
automatic for novices (L2 readers) than experts (L1 readers). 
 The aim of this chapter is to examine the automaticity of language production 
and comprehension processes, in light of three decades of research in the fields of 
psycholinguistics and attention and performance since Garrett (1983) and Levelt 
(1989) made their strong claims. Section 2 specifies what we mean with language 
processing by carving it up into processes occurring in the individual listener and 
speaker (i.e., in monologue) as well as processes occurring in dialogue. Within each 
modality, we divide language processing into a conceptual level, a syntactic level, a 
lexical level, and a sound level. Section 3 describes the classic view of automaticity 
and Section 4 describes how the classic view is applied to language processing. 
Section 5 spells out a contemporary view of automaticity (Moors, 2016) and Section 6 
examines the implications of this contemporary view for language processing. We 
review evidence relevant for the question which components of language processing 
can be considered to be more or less automatic. In Section 7, we explore the factors 
(repetition, complexity) and mechanisms (entrenchment, procedure strengthening) 
underlying automatization (i.e., the evolution of a process towards automaticity). The 
chapter closes with a discussion in Section 8.  
 
2.  Language processing 
 
In looking at automaticity on different levels of language processing, we will rely on 
the simple framework outlined in Figure 1, which divides language processing 
according to modality (production or comprehension), linguistic level, and social 
setting (monologue vs. dialogue). 
 
I. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
 A. COMPREHENSION  
1. Interpretation 
2. Syntactic level 
3. Lexical level 
4. Phonological / phonetic level 
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 B. PRODUCTION 
1. Conceptualization  
2. Formulation: syntactic level  
3. Formulation: lexical level 
4. Phonological/phonetic/articulatory level 
 
II. SOCIAL LEVEL 
1. Conversation 
Figure 1. Sketch of representational levels in language processing. 
 
Figure 1 reflects the dominant view in the field that the comprehension and 
production of language can be thought of as chains of processes through a hierarchy 
of levels. Thus, production typically begins with the intention to realize a particular 
communicative goal, and this next leads to the creation or activation of subsequent 
representations at a conceptual stratum, a lexical stratum, and a phonological stratum 
(Levelt et al., 1999; but see Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, & Hauk, 2009, for the alternative 
view that all such representations can be activated in parallel). Note that Figure 1 
sketches these processes at a rather rough grain size: If we were to zoom in on a 
particular representational level, more fine-grained sets of representations and 
processing steps would appear, but these are outside of the scope of this chapter. It is 
important to note, finally, that Figure 1 should be taken as a framework to organize 
our discussion of automaticity of different language processes; we do not commit to 
any notion that these levels are strictly hierarchically ordered or informationally 
encapsulated. 
 
 
3. Classic view of automaticity  
 
Traditionally, cognitive psychology has made a binary dichotomy between automatic 
and non-automatic processes. For example, several authors (e.g. Schneider & Shiffrin, 
1977) characterized automatic processes as ones that are initiated by appropriate 
stimulus input, without the need for the subject’s goal to engage in the process 
(unintentional or uncontrolled in the promoting sense), without demanding attentional 
capacity (efficient) or abundant time (fast), and without consciousness (unconscious), 
making it difficult to counteract the process (uncontrollable in the counteracting 
sense). Non-automatic processes are the exact mirror image: They require the 
subject’s goal to engage in the process (intentional), they demand attentional capacity 
(nonefficient) and abundant time (slow), they are conscious, and they are easy to 
counteract (controllable in the counteracting sense). Such a dichotomous view 
implies that there is coherence among the various features of automatic processes (a 
process that is unintentional is also efficient, fast, unconscious, and difficult to 
counteract) as well as among the various features of non-automatic processes (a 
process that is intentional is also non-efficient, slow, conscious, and easy to 
counteract). From such a perspective, the job of evaluating the automaticity of 
language processing boils down to examining for each of the subprocesses of 
language whether one feature of automaticity applies (e.g. unconscious).  
 
4. Application of the classic view on language processing 
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In broad strokes, it is often assumed that the “higher” or “central” levels of processing 
(interpretation, conceptualization) are more capacity demanding than the lower levels 
concerned with syntactic and lexical processing. In the case of dialogue, further 
capacity-demanding processes would come into play such as modeling the 
perspective of one’s interlocutor. These claims are based on both theoretical and 
empirical grounds. Thus, Levelt (1989) views conceptualization as a process that is 
constrained by working memory on the logical ground that it needs unrestricted 
access to semantic and episodic memory and representations of the current physical 
and social context as well as a record of the previous discourse. In contrast, 
subsequent processes of grammatical encoding and lexical retrieval execute well-
defined tasks on the basis of limited and specialized sets of representations (i.e., the 
grammar and the lexicon). Thus, grammatical and lexical processes can be carried out 
by autonomous specialist systems that do not tap into central resources (and thus have 
a high degree of automaticity). In support of capacity-constrained conceptualization, 
Levelt (1989) cites the distribution of disfluencies (“uhs”, “ums”, repetitions and the 
like) in spontaneous speech, which reflects phases of conceptualization (many 
disfluencies) followed by phases of formulation (few disfluencies). 
 For language comprehension, a similar argument can be made that lexical and 
syntactic processes can rely on restricted knowledge about words and rules, whereas 
processes such as mapping sentence structure on meaning and integrating it with 
discourse could be seen as more central processes. There is, however, considerable 
controversy in the literature about the degree of automaticity of syntactic and 
interpretation processes. For instance, Just and Carpenter (1992) proposed a working 
memory system that would be used for all verbal tasks. This system would be limited 
in capacity (with individuals varying in this capacity). Sentences would differ in their 
demand for capacity, with relatively simple sentences, such as ones with a subject-
extracted relative clause (2), demanding less capacity than more complex sentences, 
such as ones with an object-extracted relative clause (3). If a sentence’s demand for 
capacity would exceed a subject’s available capacity, comprehension would break 
down, leading to increased reading times and errors of comprehension. As support for 
this theory, Just and Carpenter (1992) cited studies that considered effects of sentence 
complexity, working memory span, and extrinsic memory load. 
 
(2) The student that scolded the teacher got into trouble. 
(3) The student that the teacher scolded got into trouble. 
 
Other authors (Caplan & Waters, 1999) agreed that sentence comprehension makes a 
demand on computational resources, but they rejected the notion of a general verbal 
working memory. These authors pointed out conceptual and empirical issues with 
measures of span and with memory load effects. Crucially, they also cited data from 
brain-damaged patients with spared sentence comprehension despite severe 
impairment of short-term memory. Rather than a general verbal working memory, 
these authors argued for a specific verbal memory for ‘sentence interpretation’ 
processes which would comprise all comprehension processes including lexical and 
syntactic processing, assigning meaning, and integrating with the discourse. 
Importantly, so-called post-interpretive processes, such as using sentence meaning to 
draw an inference, or revising an initially incorrect interpretation (4)1, would not have 																																																								
1 Many readers initially analyze the sentence as an active transitive with the defendant as the agent of 
examine, requiring them to revise their interpretation when encountering the by-phrase (Ferreira & 
Clifton, 1986). 
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access to this specialized resource. Thus, Caplan and Waters (1999) viewed all of the 
key processes in sentence comprehension as having a strong degree of automaticity: 
“Processors are thought to be obligatorily activated when their inputs are attended to. 
They generally operate unconsciously, and they usually operate quickly and 
remarkably accurately” (p. 93). 
 
 (4) The defendant examined by the lawyer stuck with his story. 
 
One might argue that at the level of dialogue, processes related to audience design 
(i.e., tailoring one’s utterances for the listener) are constrained by capacity, as this 
would require some modeling of what the listener already knows. Assuming that 
language production (and in particular conceptualization) itself already makes a 
demand on capacity, this predicts that speakers are often unsuccessful in audience 
design. Indeed, Wardlow Lane, Groisman, and Ferreira (2006) observed that in a 
referential communication task, speakers sometimes ‘leaked’ information that was 
relevant only for them and not for their interlocutor. Thus, if the speaker sees a big 
heart and a small heart and the listener can only see the big heart (because of an object 
occluding the small heart), an utterance like the big heart is overspecified and 
potentially confusing. Nevertheless, speakers often produced such overspecifications 
and, when explicitly instructed to conceal the hidden information, were in fact more 
likely to overspecify. The latter suggests that keeping the instruction in mind 
overloaded the capacity for audience design. 
 To summarize the classic view, in language production, some processes, such 
as lexical access or phonological encoding are viewed as automatic, whereas other 
processes, such as conceptualization and audience design in the context of a dialogue 
are seen as nonautomatic, as they make a demand on central resources. In language 
comprehension, most processes are seen as automatic, as many sentences can be 
understood very quickly, efficiently, and obligatory. Yet the observation that sentence 
comprehension suffers in the case of structural ambiguity or high complexity, has 
been taken to indicate that sentence comprehension is constrained by a limited 
capacity of working memory resources, and thus not so automatic after all. 
 
 
5. Contemporary view of automaticity 
 
Contradicting the assumptions of the classic all-or-none view of automaticity, authors 
(Bargh, 1992; Moors, 2016; Moors & De Houwer, 2006) have recently argued that 
the various automaticity features do not necessarily co-occur and so particular 
processes should be considered as more or less automatic rather than fully automatic 
vs. non-automatic. This argument is based on studies that showed that automaticity 
features are often not necessary and sufficient for the presence of other features. With 
regard to the relation between goals and attentional capacity, for instance, in tasks 
involving the search for an object among many irrelevant objects, visual attention is 
often not solely dependent on the subject’s goals (i.e., their task instructions) but also 
on visual properties of the display, such as the abrupt onset of a distractor stimulus or 
the presence of a distractor stimulus that shares a visual feature with the target 
(Theeuwes, 2010). Thus, having goals is not necessary for the allocation of attention. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn from studies with a paradigm that is often used in 
psycholinguistics: the visual world paradigm (e.g. Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, 
Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995). In this paradigm, subjects view a display of objects and 
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listen to speech, while eye-movements are monitored. Subjects typically look at 
objects that are referred to in speech or objects that share properties with these 
objects. Importantly, overt visual attention (as indicated by eye movements) to objects 
that are named, or that are similar to named objects, happen irrespective of whether 
the subject has the goal to find the object (Huettig, Rommers, & Meyer, 2010). Thus, 
overt visual attention can be driven by high-level properties of a stimulus in the 
absence of the goal to direct attention to that stimulus. 
 In addition to the relation between goals and attention, Moors (2016) also 
analyzed the relation between attention and consciousness and concluded that 
attention is neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness, citing studies showing 
that subjects become aware of unattended stimuli. Similarly, a stimulus does not need 
to be conscious in order for a goal-directed action to be applied on it. For example, 
Van Opstal, Gevers, Osman, and Verguts (2010) found that subjects applied the task 
(same-different judgments) to primes that were presented below the threshold of 
awareness. 
 Based on these data and considerations, Moors (2016) proposed an alternative 
view in which automaticity features are not seen as fixed properties of processes, but 
rather as factors that jointly influence whether a process will occur or not.2 The 
factors included in the automaticity concept (goals, attentional capacity, and time or 
duration) are just a subset of many factors that can all jointly influence the occurrence 
of processes, next to factors such as the direction of attention, stimulus intensity, 
expectations, unexpectedness, novelty, goal relevance, recency, and frequency. 
Building on the assumption that processes require a minimal input for their 
occurrence, Moors (2016) proposed that all of the listed factors can influence the 
quality of representations that form the input of many processes. If this 
representational quality is high enough it will trigger an (unconscious) process. If the 
representational quality is even higher, it will trigger a conscious process. Crucially, it 
is hypothesized that the listed factors influence the representational quality (and hence 
the occurrence of unconscious and conscious processes) in a compensatory way. For 
instance, stimulus intensity can trade off with stimulus duration, attention can trade 
off with stimulus repetition or training, and intention can trade off with recency. 
Empirical support comes from studies such as that of Tzur and Frost (2007). They 
manipulated both the luminance of a prime stimulus (i.e., a measure of intensity) and 
its duration and observed that an increase in luminance can compensate for a decrease 
in duration with respect to priming and vice versa. Factors that can influence 
representational quality can be divided in (a) factors related to the current stimulus 
itself (e.g. duration and intensity, but also un/expectedness, goal in/congruence, and 
novelty), (b) factors related to prior stimuli (e.g. frequency and recency), and (c) 
factors related to prior stimulus representations (e.g. goals and expectations). The 
influences of some of these factors are moderated by attention.  
 What are the implications of this view for the diagnosis of a process as 
automatic? Moors and De Houwer (2006) recommended to examine the presence or 
absence of each automaticity feature separately, and to not draw conclusions about the 
presence of one feature based on the presence of another. Moreover, given the gradual 
nature of automaticity, only relative conclusions can be drawn: Rather than 
classifying a process as automatic or not, a process can be evaluated as being more or 
less automatic than another one. Moors (2016) went one step further, however, 																																																								
2 Note that consciousness is not considered as a primary factor influencing the occurrence of 
processing, but it is shifted to the output side: the other factors determine whether the process will 
occur (unconsciously) and whether it will reach consciousness.  
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arguing that because of the compensatory relation of the factors influencing 
representational quality (and hence the occurrence of processes), it is not very 
informative to compare processes with regard to a single feature of automaticity. If a 
process is found to operate with a smaller amount of attentional capacity than another 
process, this may either indicate that the former process requires less representational 
quality than the latter, or that the stimulus input of the first process happened to be 
more intense, or that their representations were preactivated by an intention, an 
expectation, or any other type of prior stimulus presentation. Thus, studying the 
amount of attentional capacity required by a process is not very informative, unless all 
other factors are kept equal. If that is not possible it is best to map a large network of 
factors required for processes to operate. In what follows, we adopt Moors’ (2016) 
framework: Thus, we (a) see automaticity as gradual rather than all or none, (b) see 
automaticity features as a subset of many factors affecting language processes, and (c) 
assume that such factors can compensate each other, and that it is insightful to 
consider the joint effect of these many factors on the quality of an input 
representation. 
 
 
6. Application of the contemporary view on language processing 
 
In this section, we will recast the issue of automaticity of language processes in terms 
of the view that whether processes do or do not occur is a function of many driving 
factors, including but not limited to the factors implied in automaticity features 
(Moors, 2016). Mapping out the network of these factors can be called a 
“componential analysis”. Rather than attempting to be exhaustive in this analysis, we 
will present a selected number of examples, with the aim of demonstrating that such 
an analysis is possible and potentially fruitful. Once again, we divide our discussion 
according to modality (i.e., comprehension, production, and dialogue). 
 
6.1 Comprehension 
 
In this section we review studies that pertain to the features efficient and uncontrolled.  
 
6.1.1 Is comprehension efficient?  
 
As sketched above, the theory of a limited capacity for sentence comprehension has 
had much influence in the field. However, many authors have criticized this view. 
Thus, tests of verbal working memory capacity, like the reading span test, turn out to 
be not reliable (Waters & Caplan, 1996). Strikingly, there are patients with severe 
limitations of working memory capacity with spared sentence comprehension (Caplan 
& Hildebrandt, 1988). Several authors have further argued that the concept of 
‘resources’ is poorly defined and that a resource theory is impossible to falsify. For 
instance, Christiansen and McDonald (1999) argued for a connectionist theory in 
which sentence comprehension is determined by the network architecture and the rate 
of activation spreading, but not by any working memory system. 
 On the basis of these arguments, one can question whether a sentence 
comprehension system that is not capacity-constrained can still account for 
phenomena that seemingly suggest such constraints. For instance, (5) and (6) (taken 
from Van Dyke & Johns, 2012) illustrate that sentences are more difficult to 
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understand if there is more material intervening between what Van Dyke and Johns 
dub a head (the man) and its dependents (was afraid).  
 
(5) The boy understood the man was afraid. 
(6) The boy understood the man who was swimming near the dock was afraid. 
(7) It was Tony that Joey liked before the argument began. 
(8) It was the dancer that the fireman liked before the argument began. 
(9) It was the boat that the guy who lived by the sea sailed / fixed after 2 days. 
 
This is at first glance compatible with a capacity-constrained system, suggesting that 
there is not enough capacity to hold the man active and process the further 
information, so that the representation of the man has decayed by the time was afraid 
needs to be linked to it. However, Van Dyke and Johns (2012) argued that such 
findings can be explained equally well by the concept of interference. In particular, 
they argue that the content of an extrinsic memory load affects the quality of sentence 
processing. For instance, Gordon, Hendrick, & Levine (2002) showed that a memory 
load consisting of three names (e.g. JOEL – GREG – ANDY) interfered with the 
processing of a sentence with matched content (7) more strongly than a sentence with 
mismatched content (8). This suggests that the semantic overlap between memory 
load and sentence created interference. Van Dyke and McElree (2006) further claimed 
that interference takes place at the moment when an antecedent is sought for a 
dependent. These authors presented memory lists such as TABLE – SINK – TRUCK 
while sentences like (9) were presented, in which the verb (fixed or sailed) was 
separated from the antecedent (boat) by several words. All items on the memory list 
can be fixed (as is true of a boat), but in contrast to a boat, none of them can be sailed. 
If there is interference from memory at the moment an antecedent is sought for the 
verb, this would predict processing difficulty for fixed as compared to sailed. This is 
exactly what was found. On the basis of these and other findings, van Dyke and Johns 
(2012) proposed an account of sentence comprehension that is not constrained by 
capacity, but that is constrained by stimulus factors (e.g. the presence or absence of 
multiple potential antecedents for a dependent and cues for retrieval) and person 
factors (e.g. the ability to exploit retrieval cues). 
 
 
6.1.2 Is comprehension difficult to control?  
 
Provided we master a language, it seems impossible not to process an attended word 
or sentence in that language. A striking example is the well-known Stroop effect (e.g. 
MacLeod, 1991): Speakers are slower to name the ink color of a written word if that 
word is an incongruent color name (green written in red) as compared to a congruent 
color name (red written in red) or a baseline (a series of X’s or a non-color word). 
The Stroop effect demonstrates that the subject comprehends a word even though 
he/she did not intend to comprehend it and even though comprehension actually 
hinders the task at hand, which suggests that the subject tried to counteract 
comprehension (but did not succeed). These arguments plead for the unintentional 
nature of comprehension processes, as well as for the idea that they are uncontrolled 
in the counteracting sense, either in the weak sense of being difficult to counteract or 
in the stronger sense of being impossible to counteract (i.e., obligatory).  
 Studies showing that comprehension breaks down when the stimulus is 
severely degraded do not support the strong view that comprehension is obligatory, 
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however. This is illustrated by research on the perception of sine wave speech 
(Remez, Rubin, Pisoni, & Carrell, 1981). Sine wave speech is artificially synthesized 
speech consisting of a small number of sine waves with frequencies that are based on 
the formants of a real utterance. When listeners are not informed that they will hear 
speech, they typically classify this stimulus as “science fiction sounds”, “computer 
bleeps”, “music”, and, in a minority of cases, as “human speech”. Strikingly, when 
subjects are informed that they will listen to speech, they indeed perceive the sounds 
as speech and they can successfully transcribe a sentence. If they are told they will 
hear speech and are informed about the sentence, they report hearing each word of 
that sentence very clearly. This fits a view according to which a stimulus of sufficient 
quality (and which is attended to) will trigger comprehension. But a stimulus of very 
poor quality, even if it is attended to, further requires that the listener has an 
expectation to hear speech. Thus, expectation can compensate for a lack of stimulus 
quality with respect to whether comprehension takes place or not. It is interesting to 
note that Wiese, Wykowska, Zwickel, and Müller (2012) reported an analogous 
finding in the domain of gaze: Children and adults followed the gaze of people but not 
of robots, suggesting that an automatic behavior can be contingent on assumptions 
about the stimulus or situation. 
 
 
6.1.4 Summary of studies on comprehension 
 
The studies discussed in this section evaluated language comprehension in terms of 
two automaticity features. With respect to the feature efficient, we provided an 
alternative to the classic, resource-constrained view. With respect to the feature 
uncontrolled we showed that language is not always obligatorily processed: An 
attended stimulus of poor quality (as in sine wave speech) is not perceived as speech 
unless the listener expects speech. 
 
 
6.2 Production 
 
Most people find it difficult to give a speech, and many academics struggle with 
writing papers, suggesting that at least in some situations and especially in the written 
mode, language production is far from automatic. The question to what extent 
language production is automatic has not only been studied from a theoretical, but 
also from an applied perspective. After all, the question of whether talking on the 
phone (even with a hands-free kit) affects driving has obvious implications for road 
safety. Bock, Dell, Garnsey, Kramer, and Tubose (2007) had subjects produce and 
comprehend language while maneuvering a virtual environment in a driving 
simulator. Content and difficulty of production and comprehension were carefully 
matched. Both comprehension and production interfered with driving performance to 
a similar extent, suggesting that neither modality runs off fully automatically. 
 Theoretical approaches have focused most on verbal working memory and 
how this should be carved up. Just and Carpenter (1992) reported that working 
memory span tasks for comprehension (the reading span task) and for production (the 
speaking span task) correlated only moderately, and therefore suggested a 
fractionation of verbal working memory into separate resource pools for production 
and comprehension. We also note that Martin (2005) makes an even more fine-
grained division into a semantic short-term memory and a phonological short-term 
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memory. This view is mainly based on studies of patients with dissociable 
impairments in the retention of semantic and phonological information. For now, we 
set the issue of fractionating memory systems aside, and engage in a componential 
analysis of the automaticity of language production, as we did for comprehension. We 
review research pertaining to the features efficient (capacity unconstrained), 
unintentional, and unconscious.  
 
 
6.2.1 Is language production efficient?  
  
Relatively few studies have studied language production while imposing a secondary 
task. Bock et al. (2007) had people talk and drive but focused on the effect on driving 
parameters rather than speech production parameters. Kemper, Herman, and Lian 
(2003) did the reverse: Older and younger adults talked while performing one of 
several dual tasks (walking, finger tapping, ignoring irrelevant sounds). The two 
groups differed in their strategies to deal with the dual tasks: Younger speakers 
simplified and shortened the sentences whereas older speakers spoke more slowly. 
Both strategies indicate that language production is not fully automatic but at least 
partly constrained by capacity limitations. 
 Other studies attempted to isolate specific processes in language production 
such as syntactic planning and lexical access. One strand of research investigated the 
production of number agreement between subject and verb in language production. 
Bock and Miller (1991) had speakers complete sentence fragments like (10) and 
showed that the speakers sometimes produced agreement errors, as in (11), especially 
when a plural noun occurred between a singular subject and the verb. Hartsuiker and 
Barkhuysen (2006) presented this task either with or without a three-word load. They 
found an interaction between load and (speaking) span, so that by far the most 
agreement errors were produced by low-span speakers under load. More recently, 
Allen et al. (2015) presented similar stimuli to diabetics and non-diabetics while their 
blood glucose level was manipulated with an insulin clamp. Hypoglycemia resulted in 
a significant reduction of reading span and a significant loss of accuracy on the 
agreement production task. Finally, Fayol, Largy, and LeMaire (1994) conducted a 
dictation version of the task in French, exploiting the fact that singular and plural 
verbs are often homophones in that language, but differ in orthography (e.g. arrive vs. 
arrivent, ‘arrive, 1st or 3rd pers. sg.’ vs. ‘arrive, 3rd pers. pl.’). Thus, when the 
participants hear (12), they need to produce correct agreement on the basis of the 
subject’s number because the verb’s auditory form provides no information. Fayol et 
al. (1994) observed that sentences like (12) elicited many agreement errors; these 
errors were more frequent when there was a secondary task (either click counting or a 
word load).  
 
(10) The letter from the lawyers … 
(11) *The letter from the lawyers were carefully written. 
(12) Le chien des voisins arrive. (‘The dog of the neighbors arrives.’) 
 
Summarizing, this line of research suggests that the production of agreement is 
capacity constrained. Note however that it is not yet clear whether this capacity is 
needed for the core process of determining the number of the verb, or whether it is 
needed for a subsequent checking or conflict-resolution process (Hartsuiker & 
Barkhuysen, 2006).  
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 A further line of research asked whether the scope of planning in production is 
constrained by capacity. Consider an utterance like (13).  
 
(13) The hat is next to the scooter. 
 
One possibility is that speakers fully plan the utterance before articulation. But it is 
also possible that they only plan the initial part of this utterance (e.g. the hat is next) 
and then start to articulate it (perhaps while planning the second part). A crucial 
difference between these accounts is whether or not the second noun (scooter) is part 
of the initial plan. To test this, Meyer (1996) and Wagner, Jescheniak, and Schriefers 
(2010) had people name two-object scenes with sentences such as (13) while 
presenting an auditory distractor word that was related to the first noun (e.g. cap), the 
second noun (e.g. bike), or not related to either one (e.g. dog). Consistent with a broad 
planning scope, sentence naming onset was delayed both with a distractor related to 
the first and second noun. However, it has been suggested that there are individual 
differences in planning scope (Schriefers & Teruel, 1999) and it is possible that these 
differences are caused by capacity differences. In a follow-up study, Wagner et al. 
(2010) replicated Meyer’s study but now with or without a secondary task. In one 
experiment, load was induced by having the speakers remember a word list. A probe 
word was presented after sentence production and speakers indicated whether the 
probe had occurred in the list. The authors found no load effect on the scope of 
planning, which seems to argue against a capacity-constrained view of planning. 
However, when load was increased by increasing the complexity of the sentence (e.g. 
by adding adjectives) or by adding a further conceptual decision task, the interference 
effect increased for the first noun but decreased for the second noun, indicating a 
narrowing of the scope. These findings suggest that planning scope is flexible and 
dependent on available capacity. Note that the planning scope presumably also 
depends on the stimuli. Whereas the tested combinations were novel for all subjects, it 
is conceivable that frequently co-occurring combinations (e.g. the bow and arrow) 
would be planned simultaneously, as assumed by entrenched views. 
 A further dual-task study asked whether the production of single words is 
constrained by central capacity, and if so, for which stage(s) of word production this 
is the case. Ferreira and Pashler (2002) had participants simultaneously produce 
words and discriminate tones. They manipulated the difficulty of word production by 
manipulating aspects of the task and stimuli that arguably tap into early or late stages 
of word production. They reasoned that if a particular stage makes a demand on a 
central capacity, making this stage more difficult should delay performance on the 
secondary, tone-discrimination task. Manipulations related to lexical access (i.e., 
picture frequency, predictability, semantic overlap between picture and distractor 
word) all slowed down performance on the concurrent tone task. In contrast, a 
manipulation related to phonological encoding (i.e., phonological overlap between 
picture and distractor word) had no effect on the tone task. Thus, these findings 
suggest that only early stages of word production are constrained by a central 
capacity. However, Cook and Meyer (2008) provided some evidence that even the 
late stage of phoneme selection is capacity constrained. They conducted a version of 
Ferreira and Pashler’s (2002) paradigm in which a picture was named in the presence 
of either another picture with a phonologically similar or dissimilar name, a 
phonologically similar or dissimilar word, or a masked phonologically similar or 
dissimilar word. When the distractor was a picture or masked word, phonological 
relatedness sped up both picture naming and tone discrimination, suggesting that 
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phoneme selection does make a demand on a central capacity. No such effect was 
found when the word was visible, which the authors attributed to the additive effects 
of faster phoneme selection but slower self-monitoring processes.  
 In sum, studies on agreement production, planning scope, and single word 
production all suggest that language formulation is capacity constrained (i.e., non-
efficient) and thus not as automatic as often thought. We now turn to the automaticity 
features unintentional and unconscious.  
 
 
6.2.2 Can parts of language production be unintentional?   
 
The subtitle of Levelt’s (1989) book, From intention to articulation, suggests 
commitment to a view of speaking as a process with strong top-down control. The 
speaker begins with a communicative intention given the situation at hand, and then 
sets into motion a chain of processes that translate this intention into speech motor 
activity. Thus, Levelt commits to a non-automatic view, in which information is only 
expressed when there is a goal to do so (the automaticity feature intentional; see 
Section 3). If language production is indeed fully driven by the speaker’s goals, then 
productions should only contain information that realizes the goal and not 
unnecessary information that happens to be available. In contrast, the study of 
Wardlow Lane et al. (2006) discussed above showed that speakers ‘leak’ privileged 
information (i.e., that they can see both a small and a big heart) even when it is their 
explicit goal not to convey this information to the interlocutor. Thus, the authors 
conclude that “… being part of a communicative intention is not a necessary 
condition for an accessible conceptual feature to influence grammatical encoding.” (p. 
276). This conclusion resonates very well with Vigliocco and Hartsuiker’s (2002) 
review of the modularity of language production processes. These authors asked, for 
each of several interfaces in language production (e.g. between the message and 
grammatical encoding), whether processing at level n was affected by information at 
level n + 1 that was not part of its core input. Consistent with Wardlow Lane et al. 
(2006), they cited numerous studies in which accessible, but irrelevant conceptual 
features affected grammatical processing. For instance, even though the notional 
number of the head noun’s referent in a distributive sentence like (14) is not relevant 
for determining the verb’s number, numerous studies have shown that agreement 
errors are much more likely with distributive rather than non-distributive sentences 
like (15) (e.g. Vigliocco, Hartsuiker, Jarema, & Kolk, 1996). In a similar vein, studies 
like Cook and Meyer (2008, see above) demonstrate that a picture one does not intend 
to name still leads to activation of its phonology, and can therefore facilitate the 
production of another picture that one does intend to name. Together these studies 
show that conceptual information outside of the speaker’s (conscious) goals can still 
influence production, in contrast to the view that production is always intentional and 
thus non-automatic in this sense. 
 
(14) The label on the bottles is green. 
(15) The baby on the blankets is cute. 
 
However, Strijkers, Holcomb, and Costa (2011) argued that (conscious) intention 
matters for the time course of the naming process. They presented pictures of 
common objects with low frequency and high frequency names and measured EEG. 
In one condition, subjects were instructed to name the pictures. In another condition 
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they performed a non-verbal categorization task on the pictures. Event-related brain 
potentials were sensitive to the frequency manipulation in both tasks, suggesting that 
the pictures triggered production processes in both cases. However, in the naming 
task such frequency effects began already after 152 ms, whereas they began 200 ms 
later in the categorization task. Thus, although intentions are not necessary to set 
production into motion, having such an intention speeds up that process considerably. 
 Of further relevance to the issue of intentionality, Lind, Hall, Breidegard, 
Balkenius, and Johansson (2014) argued that speakers sometimes have no clear 
‘preview’ of what they are about to say and rather infer this on the basis of auditory 
feedback. They reported a study in which participants engaged in a Stroop task but in 
which auditory feedback was occasionally manipulated. For instance, when a speaker 
correctly named the color (grey) of the word green printed in grey, auditory feedback 
would sometimes be replaced, in real time, with a recording of that same speaker 
saying green (the recording was made in an earlier phase of the experiment). On such 
occasions, speakers often accepted the feedback as if they had produced that speech 
themselves. From this, the authors concluded that speakers often underspecify their 
intentions and construct them on the basis of feedback. Therefore, the sense of 
authorship of one’s speech act would be reconstructive rather than predictive. 
 
 
6.2.3 Can unconscious stimuli influence language production?  
 
Stimuli do not need to be conscious in order to influence language production. Above, 
we already gave an example (Cook & Meyer, 2008) of a study in which masked 
presentation of a word that was phonologically similar to a target picture facilitated 
naming of that picture. Several studies have also shown semantic effects of masked 
word primes (Dhooge & Hartsuiker, 2010; Finkbeiner & Caramazza, 2006). In 
contrast to tasks with visible primes (which typically show semantic interference), 
masking the distractor leads to semantic facilitation. Finkbeiner and Caramazza 
(2006) accounted for this in terms of multiple loci at which a semantic relationship 
plays a role. Masked distractors would lead to facilitation because they would activate 
their corresponding concept, which would spread activation to the target concept. 
Visible distractors would do the same, but would further occupy a response output 
buffer. A semantic relationship would render the distractor difficult to exclude (as it 
resembles the target) from that buffer, slowing down the process. 
 
 
6.2.4 Summary of studies on production 
 
Summarizing, the review of production processes focused on three features of 
automaticity: efficient, unintentional, and unconscious. Studies considering efficiency 
indicate that language production is constrained by a central capacity. This not only 
holds for the higher-level processes involved in conceptualization, but also for lower-
level processes that deal with syntactic and lexical aspects of formulation. These data 
contradict the classical view that only higher-level production processes are capacity 
demanding. With respect to the feature unintentional, we have seen that language 
production is not exclusively driven by (conscious) goals. Speakers are affected by 
information at the conceptual level that is irrelevant to their current goals and even 
detrimental to the realization of these goals. At the same time, having the conscious 
intention to name an object drastically reduces the time required for production 
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processes. This is in line with the hypothesis that factors implied in automaticity (and 
beyond) can compensate each other in their influence on the occurrence of processes. 
A final finding is that masked priming studies show that unconscious stimuli can 
influence language production.   
 
 
6.3 Dialogue 
 
Most research in psycholinguistics has studied the case of monologue; in typical 
studies, participants listen to sentences from a tape recording or speak the words 
labelling objects in pictures into a voice key. This is obviously quite different from 
the way language is typically used in the real word, namely in dialogues where an 
interlocutor interacts with another person and alternates between speaking and 
listening, and where communicative goals arise naturally in the context rather than as 
the result of an experimenter's instruction. At first glance, dialogue involves complex 
interactions among individuals. First, dialogue involves the coordination of turn 
taking. Analyses of the timing of turn taking (Wilson & Wilson, 2005) show that 
pauses between turns are often shorter than 200 ms and sometimes even 0 ms. This 
implies that speakers do not wait for the end of the previous speaker’s turn to plan 
their utterance; rather, they must predict when the other speaker will end and plan 
their own turn so that it seamlessly continues the previous turn.  
Second, successful dialogue arguably requires each participant to take into 
account the cognitive state of the other participant. After all, it makes little sense to 
state something that the other person already knows (e.g. because it was said just 
before or because it is blatantly obvious given that both dialogue partners share a 
common perceptual context) or that it is impossible to understand for the other person 
given that she lacks an essential piece of information. Thus, interlocutors need to have 
a representation of what is in the common ground for both and what information 
related to the current topic is known or unknown by the other person. However, as the 
study of Wardlow Lane et al. (2006) discussed above shows, speakers do not always 
successfully tailor their utterances to the listener's perspective and seem to be worse at 
this when they are provided with a further task (namely to conceal information from 
the listener). This suggests that these complex processes are capacity limited, but it 
may also be the case that interlocutors do not always engage in them.  
Finally, dialogue increases demands on monitoring systems (Postma, 2000). 
This involves self-monitoring for appropriateness and well-formedness but also for 
communicative success (‘Has my interlocutor understood me?’). Furthermore, it 
involves monitoring the other person’s productions (‘Have they made a speech error 
or did they mean that? Have I heard this correctly or have I misperceived this?’). 
According to an influential view (Levelt, 1989), monitoring is a non-automatic 
process, although it should be noted that this argument seemed to be solely supported 
by introspection “… self-corrections are hardly ever made without a touch of 
awareness” (p. 21). 
 Given the complex set of demands dialogue seems to make on functions such 
as memory, inference making, monitoring, and prediction, Garrod and Pickering 
(2004) asked “Why is conversation so easy?”. They proposed a theory that views 
dialogue as a joint action, in which two actors collaborate to achieve a common goal 
(like a pair of ballroom dancers or, more mundane, two people carrying away a table). 
In such joint actions, there are usually no explicit negotiations (e.g. a countdown 
before lifting up the table); rather, the two actors interactively coordinate by mutually 
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adapting their action to the perception of the other person’s actions (i.e., interactive 
alignment). Similarly, two interlocutors have a joint goal, which Pickering and Garrod 
(2004) define as aligning their “situation models”. These are “multi-dimensional 
representations containing information about space, time, causality, intentionality, and 
currently relevant individuals” (p. 8). To converge upon overlapping situation models, 
interlocutors would not use explicit negotiation nor would they engage much in 
creating models of each other’s mental states. Rather, dialogue partners would align 
in an interactive way (similar to the example of lifting up the table) and they would do 
so by mutual priming (i.e., pre-activation) of representations at each linguistic level. 
Because representations from comprehension would prime representations in 
production, dialogue partners tend to converge on the same realization of speech 
sounds, the same words, and the same syntactic choices. Indeed, there is much 
evidence for priming from comprehension to production at many different levels (see 
Pickering & Garrod, 2004, for a review).  
 To summarize, at first glance there seem to be many reasons why dialogue 
might be non-automatic: It is hard to estimate when to take turns, to model the state of 
mind of the other person, and to tailor one’s utterance to the social and dialogue 
context. In other words, the processes involved in dialogue are deemed too complex 
to be automatic. On the other hand, introspection tells us that dialogue is actually 
really easy especially as compared to holding a monologue. Part of the solution may 
lie in the consideration that the processes involved in dialogue are less complex than 
they seem. This aligns with the explanations for automatization discussed in the next 
section.  
 
 
7. How to explain automatization?  
 
7.1 Factors influencing automatization  
 
A well-established observation is that processes and behavior become more automatic 
as a result of practice (also called repetition, training, frequency) and that the 
complexity of a process is a factor that can impede automatization. We illustrate the 
role of complexity in the context of sentence comprehension. The question of how 
much complexity is involved in sentence comprehension in fact has been the topic of 
a theoretical divide in the field. On the one hand, modular models (Frazier, 1987) hold 
that the initial analysis of a sentence is determined only by the syntactic categories 
(e.g. Noun, Verb, Preposition) of the input words. The parsing mechanism builds up a 
single analysis on the basis of a few syntactic principles (e.g. build a structure that is 
as simple as possible). Thus, when the listener hears something like put the apple on 
the towel …, the parsing system will build up an analysis in which on the towel is an 
argument of the verb put (it is the target location of the apple) rather than a modifier 
of apple. This is because the latter structure requires a more complex structure (i.e., it 
would be a reduced relative clause).  
 On the other hand, constraint-based models would argue that the parsing 
system uses all potential sources of information right away, including properties of 
the lexical items and their frequency of co-occurrence with particular structures, 
information about prior discourse, and knowledge of the world. Such accounts predict 
that on the towel can either be interpreted as an argument of the verb or as a modifier 
of the noun, depending on the situation. Consistent with this latter view, Tanenhaus et 
al. (1995) demonstrated that if a display contained an apple on a towel, a box, an 
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empty towel, and an irrelevant object, participants hearing put the apple on the towel 
would first look at the apple and then at the empty towel. When the sentence was then 
disambiguated (in the box) they quickly moved the eyes to the box, the actual target 
location. However, when the display was changed so that the irrelevant object was 
replaced by an apple on a napkin, participants no longer misanalyzed the sentence: 
When hearing apple they alternated between both apples, but when hearing towel they 
looked at the apple on the towel and not at the empty towel. Thus, if the parser has a 
choice between two different analyses, this choice is not exclusively driven by only 
the strictly necessary input, as modularist accounts would have it. Rather, the choice 
is determined by the input in conjunction with a host of other factors, which even 
includes the visual context.  
 
 
7.2 Mechanisms underlying automatization 
 
In addition to asking which factors can influence automatization, researchers have 
asked which learning mechanisms (situated on a lower level of analysis) could be 
responsible for the automatization of a process (situated on a higher level of analysis).  
According to Logan (1988), automatization is explained by a shift from algorithm 
computation (or multi-step memory retrieval) to direct (or single-step) memory 
retrieval. Children who learn to add pairs of digits initially count the units of both 
digits, but once a sufficiently strong association is formed in memory between the 
pair of digits and their sum, they retrieve this sum from memory, thereby 
circumventing the counting of units.  
As an alternative to the shift to direct memory retrieval, Anderson (1992; see 
also Tzelgov, Yehene, Kotler, & Alon, 2000) argued that automatization can also be 
explained by the learning mechanism of procedure strengthening. Repetition of the 
same procedure (applied to the same or different stimuli) results in the storage of this 
procedure in procedural memory, which can be retrieved and applied faster and more 
efficiently thereafter.  
Both learning mechanisms of direct memory retrieval and procedure 
strengthening seem to be covered in the language domain by the notion of 
entrenchment or chunking3, a set of mechanisms by which previously serially 
activated knowledge becomes clustered in a holistic unit or chunk. An equivalent of 
Logan’s direct memory retrieval in the language is provided by Arnon and Snider’s 
(2010) demonstration that speakers produce multi-word phrases (e.g. “don’t have to 
worry”) more quickly when these phrases appear more frequently (and that this 
cannot be reduced to the frequency of the individual words outside of these phrases). 
This suggests that an association is formed between the words within the phrases 
(“don’t have” and “worry”) just like digits are associated with their sum (“1+2” and 
“3”). An equivalent of procedure strengthening in the language domain is proposed in 
models of syntactic processing in which repeated exposure to a syntactic structure 
results in the strengthening of the network connections needed for the production of 
that structure (Chang, Dell, & Bock, 2006).  																																																								
3 The notion of entrenchment has been defined in various ways. Sometimes it is defined as a factor 
(i.e., repetition). At other times, it is defined as a lower-level process or mechanism (i.e., the creation of 
a holistic unit or chunk). At still other times, it is defined as an effect (i.e., the holistic unit, or the 
automaticity of a process). We argue for the clear separation of factors, effects, and mechanisms, and 
propose using entrenchment in the sense of “mechanism”.    	
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 Pickering and Garrod (2004) argued for entrenchment as an important 
explanation for the increasing fluency or automaticity of dialogue. They explicitly 
challenged the view that during each production, the speaker moves through all levels 
of processing as in Figure 1. Whenever they can, speakers will skip production levels, 
specifically when they produce a series of words that has become a routine. Indeed, 
casual speech contains many chunks of words that are recycled from the past, 
including, but certainly not limited to, idioms and stock phrases. Thus, when a 
speaker produces “thank you very much” in a conversation, he might retrieve this in 
one go rather than going through the “normal” stages of conceptually driven word 
retrieval and combination. Such a view nicely fits with Arnon and Snider’s (2010) 
finding that the frequency of multiword utterances predicts their production latencies. 
But what is more, Pickering and Garrod argue that routinization does not only happen 
at the level of the language, but also in the much more restricted situation of single 
conversations. Thus, one can easily imagine a conversation in which a speaker 
introduces a novel multiword utterance that is repeated several times (because it is the 
topic of conversation and because of massive priming). As a result, this utterance 
would become entrenched (or routinized) on the fly, allowing the conversation 
partners to re-use it in one go, just like routines that are more fixed in the language. 
Garrod and Pickering (2004) argue that an architecture in which there is massive 
priming and routinization on the fly solves many of the “problems” of dialogue. For 
instance, because interlocutors would, in the course of dialogue, converge upon a 
shared set of aligned representations (an “implicit common ground”) there is no need 
to infer each other’s state of mind. And because of entrenchment taking place within 
the time frame of a single dialogue, speakers can short-circuit some of the complex 
production processes and instead retrieve longer utterances directly. 
 
 
8. Discussion 
 
Is parsing basically a reflex? Does language formulation proceed largely 
automatically? There are no simple yes-no answers to such questions, because 
automaticity features do not form coherent sets. Thus, a process can be more 
automatic with respect to one feature, while being less automatic with respect to 
another. In our discussion of language comprehension, we examined the features 
efficient and intentional. Regarding efficiency, there is an extensive literature that has 
argued for a capacity-constrained (less automatic) language comprehension system, 
while at the same time debating the nature of this capacity. But it is possible that 
effects that seem to imply a limited capacity can be explained by other factors, such 
as interference during retrieval operations. Another automaticity feature is 
unintentional: whether the goal to engage in the process of comprehending causes it. 
Certain stimuli, even when the person has the goal to comprehend them do not trigger 
comprehension by themselves, but only when the perceiver explicitly expects speech.  
 Language production can similarly be seen as a collection of more and less 
automatic processes depending on the specific automaticity features considered. 
Regarding the feature efficient, language production, like comprehension, often has 
been viewed as constrained by a capacity. In contrast to the classic view of automatic 
lower-level processes in production, there is evidence supporting capacity limitations 
for lexical access and grammatical encoding. However, consideration of the feature 
intentional shows that language production is not a fully non-automatic process 
either. Even though the (conscious) intention to name an object speeds up production 
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processes, it may not be needed to trigger it. Further, if feedback is distorted, speakers 
sometimes claim agency for the production of words they did not intend to say and in 
fact did not say. Finally, with respect to the feature unconscious, we have seen that 
information does not need not to be conscious in order to affect production.  
 Dialogue, at first glance, appears to make a demand on highly non-automatic 
processes such as making predictions about when it would be a good moment to take 
turns or reasoning about the mental states of the other person. In contrast, the 
interactive alignment theory of Pickering and Garrod (2004) claims that dialogue 
relies on less complex processes than is usually assumed and hence that less demand 
is needed than sometimes thought.  
 It thus appears that none of the language processes we have considered can 
easily be characterized as fully (or even largely) automatic vs. fully (largely) non-
automatic. This is consistent with Moors’ (2016) argument that automaticity features 
do not form coherent sets. Instead, it may be more fruitful to consider automaticity 
features as a subset of many mutually compensatory factors that jointly influence 
whether and how a particular process will be carried out. Thus, an attended sentence 
will elicit comprehension processes, unless its quality is sub-threshold. But poor 
stimulus quality can be compensated by expectations. Similarly, an intention to speak 
is not necessary to trigger production processes but does affect the speed of such 
processes. Such a framework, in which automaticity features are only a subset of a 
legion of factors driving (or blocking) cognitive processes, and in which these 
features do not necessarily co-vary, does raise the question of whether the 
automaticity concept still adds anything to the analysis of cognitive processes. Navon 
(1984) famously compared the concept of resources to a “soup stone.4” Perhaps 
automaticity is a soup stone too. 
 With regard to the explanation of automatization, we pointed at factors such as 
repetition, recency (or priming), and complexity. We also discussed entrenchment as 
a set of learning mechanism (such as direct memory retrieval and procedure 
strengthening) that can render a production or comprehension process more 
automatic. Entrenchment plays a major role in Pickering and Garrod’s (2004) 
mechanistic theory of dialogue, both in the sense of having entrenched, long-term 
memory representations of units in one’s language (e.g. a commonly used four-word 
combination) and in the sense of creating entrenched units on the fly during a 
dialogue (e.g. a particular referring expression that one of the interlocutors introduces 
in the dialogue and which is then repeated). Entrenchment (in both of these senses) 
creates subroutines that alleviate the burden of processing and thereby increase 
automaticity. 
 We end this chapter with a discussion of two theoretical issues that deserve 
further scrutiny in the future. First, one can make a theoretical distinction between 
core language processes and secondary language processes. Blurring of this 
distinction can have repercussions for the assignment of automaticity features to these 
core processes. With core processes, we mean processes that translate a linguistic 
representation at level n in a hierarchically organized sequence of processes to a 
representation at level n+1: for instance, the process of retrieving a word on the basis 
of a concept. Secondary processes are processes that oversee core processes and 
intervene. For instance, if the core process of word retrieval makes a mistake (e.g. 
retrieving dog instead of cat), a self-monitoring system may detect this and set into 																																																								4	Navon	described	a	Jewish	legend	about	a	magical	stone	that	was	claimed	to	result	in	soup	when	added	to	boiling	water.	However,	the	soup	would	be	better	when	vegetables	were	also	added	and	even	better	if	you	put	in	meat	as	well…	
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motion processes of interruption and correction (e.g. Hartsuiker & Kolk, 2001). 
Similarly, if the parser has produced an initial analysis that turns out to be incorrect, a 
revision system might abandon the initial analysis and replace it with an alternative 
analysis. Detailed assessment of automaticity needs to find a way of distinguishing 
whether a given automaticity feature applies to the relevant core process itself, or to a 
secondary process operating on it. For instance, Hartsuiker and Barkhuysen (2006) 
argued that effects of extrinsic memory load on agreement production did not affect 
the core processes that determine the number of the verb, but rather a checking 
process, which, given enough capacity, would weed out incorrect number markings. 
 Second, the concept of automaticity is separate from but related to the issue of 
modularity, as cognitive modules would have many of the features of automatic 
processes. The issue of modularity has had a profound influence on the literature for 
many decades. Many studies on the modularity of language processes have focused 
on information encapsulation. Thus, if a language processing level is a module, it 
responds only to its strictly necessary input and does not take into account other 
information. Much work in language comprehension and production has provided 
evidence against information encapsulation: Thus, parsing decisions are affected by 
information in the visual context, and language production decisions are affected by 
accessible but irrelevant conceptual features.  
 This chapter has reviewed a subset of the language processing literature and 
interpreted the findings in terms of a componential view of automaticity. An obvious 
caveat is that our selection of the literature is not exhaustive but exemplary. Thus, a 
more ambitious goal would be to try to map out the interrelations between many more 
factors (related to automaticity and beyond) for the complete set of core cognitive 
processes involved in production and comprehension, in monologue and dialogue, 
while taking into account the possible influences of secondary processes like checking 
and revising. 
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